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The Trademark Scholars Roundtable participants discussed a wide range of approaches
to understanding and limiting the ever-increasing sprawl of trademark rights. It was a
productive and stimulating discussion. In this essay, I would like to combine some of my
own ideas with points and suggestions made by the other participants, to sketch out a possible
judicial approach to regulating the sprawl. Before discussing a potential solution, however, it
is important to understand the nature of the problem, and some of its primary causes.
Section I will discuss the problem and set the stage for my proposal. Section II will
then suggest that courts relegate certain particularly problematic new forms of trademark
infringement claims to a “passing off/associational marketing” evaluation. It will anchor
this proposal in the historic development of the common law and courts’ construction of the
Lanham Act, and then explore some of the rules, presumptions and defenses that might cabin
this more limited cause of action.
I. The Problem
7KH FRXUWV GHYHORSHG WUDGHPDUN ODZ WR VHUYH D OLPLWHG SXUSRVH WR IDFLOLWDWH HIÀFLHQW
competition by enabling merchants to adopt a particular word or symbol to identify their
goods, and prevent other merchants from using a confusingly similar word or symbol to
identify their own goods, when doing so would be likely to cause mistaken purchases. These
limited rights in words and symbols ensure that consumers can easily and quickly identify
and distinguish the goods of competing producers and effectively exercise their purchasing
preferences. This reduces consumer search costs and enables consumers to reward quality
through repeat patronage. The potential for repeat patronage, in turn, enables producers to
EHQHÀWIURPLQYHVWPHQWLQSURGXFWTXDOLW\DQGWKXVHQFRXUDJHVWKHPWRVWULYHIRUTXDOLW\
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However, courts recognized that overprotection of marks can actually undercut marketplace
FRPSHWLWLRQDQGHIÀFLHQF\E\HQDEOLQJPDUNRZQHUVWRLQWHUIHUHXQQHFHVVDULO\ZLWKWKHÁRZ
of useful marketplace information to consumers. Overly broad rights in marks may prevent
competing producers from effectively communicating the nature, qualities and characteristics
of their own products to interested consumers, or prevent competitors, consumers or the
media from engaging in critical product critiques and commentary. Overly broad protection
of marks may prevent or unnecessarily complicate development of new digital technologies
that assist consumers and promote competition by enhancing or aggregating available product
information. Overly broad protection of marks may enable mark owners to prevent competitors
from selling similar unpatented products and erect other barriers to market entry. Moreover,
rights in marks may intrude impermissibly on the public’s First Amendment interests in
freedom of speech. To ensure that harmful overprotection would not occur, courts built a
number of limiting doctrines into the infringement cause of action, and have invoked a range
of external limitations as well.
Thus, trademark law is best understood as a careful balance of competing marketplace
interests. Nonetheless, over the years, the scope of trademark protection has gradually but
steadily expanded. Under modern marketing practices, marks have grown from symbols
to enable consumers to differentiate products to sophisticated selling tools, the subject of
tremendous investment and careful, expert sculpting. Mark owners have come to view marks
as vital business assets in themselves—“brands” that encompass and convey not just source,
but a whole construct of compelling imagery, prestige, personality, and hooks to facilitate
FRQVXPHUVHOILGHQWLÀFDWLRQZLWKWKHSURGXFWDQGWKXVFHPHQWEUDQGOR\DOW\
Where investment goes, an inherent sense of property right tends to follow, regardless of
what black-letter law has to say about it. The notion of property arises from a deep-seated (if
SHUKDSVPLVJXLGHG VHQVHRIPRUDOLW\LIDSHUVRQLQYHVWVWKHQKHVKRXOGUHDSWKHIXOOEHQHÀW
RIWKHLQYHVWPHQW7RPDQ\SHRSOHLWVHHPVLQWULQVLFDOO\XQIDLUIRURWKHUVWRVLSKRQRIIEHQHÀW
even when doing so may promote the overall public good. Free riding feels uncomfortably
like theft. So as marks take on psychological attributes of property (by virtue of their owners’
investment), additional notions of actionable harm come to the fore. As Mark Lemley
succinctly put it: If any value that arises from use or reference to a mark should belong to the
mark owner, then the mark owner is “harmed” whenever someone else derives value from the
use or reference without paying for a license. Never mind that the use caused no consumers
to make mistaken purchases, and may actually have promoted consumer interests in price and
quality competition, or constituted First Amendment protected expression.
Mark owners communicate their attitudes about investment and property to courts and
the public: Investments need to be protected, and perhaps more harm, beyond undercutting
consumer reliance interests and deprivation of license revenue, arises from unauthorized
use of marks. Others’ unauthorized use or reference to the mark may create new, unwanted
consumer associations with the mark, may distort or diminish the carefully cultivated brand
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identity, may undercut the carefully honed aura of exclusivity and uniqueness. To protect
their investment, many mark owners would like complete control over use of their word or
symbol. Concerns arise: if mark owners can’t have the desired control over their marks, they
may not invest in brand differentiation, or even in innovative new products and services.
The complicating factor, of course, is that such expansive property rights in words and
symbols is likely to cause the serious competition, technological development, and First
$PHQGPHQWKDUPVLGHQWLÀHGDERYHLQWKHGLVFXVVLRQRIRYHUSURWHFWLRQ0RUHRYHUDV5DOSK
%URZQH[SODLQHGLQDOOZHUHDOO\QHHGLQRUGHUWRKDYHDQHIÀFLHQWFRPSHWLWLYHPDUNHW
is “information as to source,” so that consumers can assign good will or blame to the proper
producer and repeat satisfactory purchases. All the additional hype and imagery of a “brand”
LVRITXHVWLRQDEOHSXEOLFEHQHÀW1 And as the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed, Congress
designed the patent and copyright laws, not trademark law, to provide economic incentives
to invest in creative endeavors.2 Overly broad construction of trademark law can actually
undercut the effectiveness of Congress’ innovation and investment-inducing strategies under
the Patent and Copyright Acts.
Notwithstanding such practical considerations, however, the inherent, emotionally resonant
VHQVH RI SURSHUW\ KDV VORZO\ EXW VWHDGLO\ LQÁXHQFHG DQG FRQWLQXHV WR LQÁXHQFH  FRXUWV·
decision-making process in trademark infringement cases. It has lead courts repeatedly to
extend the scope of actionable “likelihood of confusion.”
Initially, the only actionable confusion was confusion about product source, which could
lead consumers to buy the defendant’s product, thinking it was the plaintiff’s. Clearly such
confusion is harmful, as it undercuts consumers’ ability to rely on marks for information
about product source (which in turn enables them to infer product quality and characteristics),
and thus intelligently exercise their purchasing preferences. And the resulting inability of
purchasers to repeat satisfying purchases undercuts mark owners’ incentive to invest in product
quality. Courts later extended infringement liability to uses of marks that created a likelihood
of consumer confusion about whether the mark owner sponsored the defendant’s product or
whether the parties were DIÀOLDWHG. As Mark McKenna and Mark Lemley point out,3 there is
VRPHSUDFWLFDOMXVWLÀFDWLRQIRUWKLVDVSURGXFHUVEHJDQWRJURZDQGGLYHUVLI\DQGOLFHQVHRU
franchise others to produce related products under their marks, a defendant’s unauthorized
use of the mark might cause consumers mistakenly to predict that the defendant’s product
has quality or characteristics they associate with the mark owner, and mistakenly purchase a
product that lacks those attributes. This harms consumers, and, to the extent that consumers
2 See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 33-34 (2003), TrafFix Devices,
Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001).
3 Ralph
Mark A.
Lemley
& Mark McKenna, ,UUHOHYDQW&RQIXVLRQ62 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2010).57 YALE L. J. 1165,
1.
Brown,
$GYHUWLVLQJDQGWKH3XEOLF,QWHUHVW/HJDO3URWHFWLRQRI7UDGH6\PEROV,
1180–81 (1948).
2. See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003), TrafFix Devices,
Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001).
3. Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, ,UUHOHYDQW&RQIXVLRQ62 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2010).
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hold the mark owner responsible for the defendant’s unsatisfactory quality and characteristics,
this may injure the mark owner’s reputation and undercut its incentive to invest in product
quality.
+RZHYHU D PLVWDNHQ EHOLHI DERXW ´VSRQVRUVKLSµ RU ´DIÀOLDWLRQµ LV RQO\ KDUPIXO IURP D
societal standpoint if consumers rely on it to make assumptions about product quality or
characteristics. Absent reliance for such quality-related information, confusion about the
existence of a license agreement, in particular, causes none of the harm that trademark law
traditionally has undertaken to address. Courts have nonetheless imposed infringement liability
IRUFRQIXVLRQDERXW´VSRQVRUVKLSµRU´DIÀOLDWLRQµZHOOEH\RQGVHWWLQJVLQZKLFKFRQVXPHUV
might rely on mistaken assumptions about relationship for substantive information about
product quality or characteristics. For example, courts have repeatedly relied on possible
consumer confusion about the existence of a license agreement to permit sports teams to
enjoin others’ replication of their marks on the fronts of tee shirts and hats. It is unlikely that
consumers consider the possibility of a team license in evaluating the quality of the shirt or
hat. However, since good will for the sports team creates demand for the shirts, courts have
enabled the team mark owners (through their licensees) to monopolize the market for the shirts
DQGKDWVEHDULQJWHDPHPEOHPVGHSULYLQJFRQVXPHUVRIWKHEHQHÀWVRISULFHFRPSHWLWLRQ4
$QRWKHU H[DPSOH RI WKH ´SURSHUW\ ULJKWµ LQÁXHQFH DULVHV ZKHQ PDUN RZQHUV VHHN WR
LPSRVH LQIULQJHPHQW OLDELOLW\ RQ PRYLH SURGXFHUV IRU ÀOP VFHQHV GHSLFWLQJ SURGXFWV WKDW
EHDULGHQWLÀDEOHPDUNV5 Mark owners often pay movie producers to depict their products and
PDUNVLQÀOPV'RHVSRVVLEOHFRQIXVLRQDERXWZKHWKHUWKDWKDSSHQHGLQDSDUWLFXODUPRYLH
MXVWLI\SURKLELWLQJPRYLHSURGXFHUVIURPLQFOXGLQJDQLGHQWLÀDEOHSURGXFWLQDVFHQHDEVHQWD
license? Surely consumers will not rely on the presence of “Caterpillar” on a tractor depicted
LQDQDFWLRQVFHQHWRDVVHVVWKHTXDOLW\RUFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIWKHÀOPRUPLVWDNHQO\EX\WKHDWHU
tickets based on the assumption that the tractor mark owner oversaw and controlled the
TXDOLW\RIWKHÀOP+RZHYHUPDQ\PDUNRZQHUVDUHPRWLYDWHGWRWU\WRFRQWURODOOGHSLFWLRQV
of their mark. A movie’s depiction of a “Caterpillar” tractor destroying pristine rain forest
may be inconsistent with the image the mark owner wants the mark to convey. It may thus
XQGHUFXWWKHPDUNRZQHU·VLQYHVWPHQW1HYHUPLQGWKHÀOPSURGXFHU·VDQGWKHSXEOLF·V)LUVW
Amendment interests in free artistic expression.
Courts have also expanded the scope of actionable consumer confusion by imposing
liability for “initial interest confusion”—temporary confusion about whether the defendant is
related to the mark owner, that is cleared up prior to any purchase transaction. There are no
mistaken purchases, because the temporarily confused consumers do not rely on the mark for
4 See, e.g., Boston Athletic Assn. v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1989); Boston Prof’l Hockey Assn., Inc.
v. Dallas
CapBoston
& Emblem
Mfg.,
510v.F.2d
1004 (5th
423 U.S.
868 Hockey
(1975). Assn., Inc. v.
4.
See, e.g.,
Athletic
Assn.
Sullivan,
867 Cir.
F.2d1975),
22 (1stFHUWGHQLHG
Cir. 1989); Boston
Prof’l
5Dallas
See,Cap
e.g.,&Caterpillar,
Inc.
v.
Walt
Disney
Co.,
287
F.Supp.2d
913
(C.D.
Ill.
2003);
Wham-O,
Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975), FHUWGHQLHG 423 U.S. 868 (1975). Inc. v.
Paramount
Pictures
Corp.,
F.Supp.2d
(N.D.
Cal. 2003).
5. See, e.g., Caterpillar,
Inc.286
v. Walt
Disney1254
Co., 287
F. Supp.
2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 2003); Wham-O, Inc. v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
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information about the quality or characteristics of the product they ultimately buy. But the
QRWLRQRI´SURSHUW\µLQPDUNVKDVLQÁXHQFHGFRXUWVWRLPSRVHOLDELOLW\EHFDXVHWKHGHIHQGDQW
KDUQHVVHGWKHPDUNRZQHU·VJRRGZLOOEULHÁ\WREULQJFRQVXPHUVWRLWVGRRUVWHSDQGJLYH
it the opportunity to make its own sales pitch. This constitutes free riding on the mark’s
good will. Courts have also based infringement liability on “post-sale confusion,” where
the purchaser knows exactly what she is buying, but persons encountering the product after
the purchase might confuse the defendant’s product with the mark owner’s. Such confusion
may possibly mislead the post-sale observers about the qualities and characteristics of the
PDUN RZQHU·V SURGXFWV DQG LQÁXHQFH WKHLU SXUFKDVH GHFLVLRQV DW VRPH XQFHUWDLQ SRLQW LQ
the future. But perhaps more importantly, if prospective purchasers observe too many rank
DQGÀOHSHUVRQVVHHPLQJO\LQSRVVHVVLRQRIWKHPDUNRZQHU·VH[SHQVLYHSURGXFWWKLVPD\
undercut the mark owner’s investment in creating an aura of mark prestige and exclusivity.
Apart from expanding what consumers may be confused about, and the relevant timing of their
FRQIXVLRQFRXUWVKDYHRIWHQVWUDLQHGWRMXVWLI\DÀQGLQJRIOLNHOLKRRGRIFRQVXPHUFRQIXVLRQ
on exceedingly sparse and questionable evidence.6 Courts have held that an infringement
plaintiff may successfully demonstrate an actionable likelihood of confusion through survey
evidence demonstrating that 10-15% of prospective purchasers may be confused.7 Some
GHFLVLRQVDSSHDUWRÀQGWKDWno real likelihood of confusion need be demonstrated at all, if the
defendant’s reference to the plaintiff’s mark might divert potential sales.8
Further impacting the traditional balance of competing interests, courts have lost sight of
the “trademark use” requirement, which traditionally served as a limitation on the reach of
mark owners’ rights. At common law, the infringement plaintiff was required to demonstrate
that the defendant used its allegedly infringing word or symbol “as a mark,” to indicate the
source of its own goods or services, before the issue of likelihood of confusion could be
reached. (Use “as a mark” entailed closely, directly associating the mark with the defendant’s
goods or services, in a manner that was perceptible to consumers and that consumers would
likely understand to indicate the source of those goods or services.)9 This requirement limited
the infringement cause of action to commercial speech (which enjoys less First Amendment
protection) in most cases, and tended to limit infringement remedies to cases in which the
SRWHQWLDOKDUPWRFRQVXPHUUHOLDQFHLQWHUHVWVMXVWLÀHGWKHH[SHQGLWXUHRIMXGLFLDOUHVRXUFHVWR
undertake further investigation into likely consumer confusion. However, with the advent of
the Internet, courts have whittled down the “use” limitation to little more than a requirement
that the defendant use the mark in a commercial context. They have imposed infringement
6 See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8tht Cir. 1994), FHUWGHQLHG513 U.S.
1112 (1995); Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novack, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987), FHUWGHQLHG488 U.S. 933
(1988).
6. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994), FHUWGHQLHG513 U.S. 1112
7 J. THOMAS
CCOmaha
ARTHY, Ins.
MCCCo.
ARTHY
ON TRADEMARKS
NFAIR
COMPETITION
, § 23:2 (2010).U.S. 933 (1988).
(1995);
MutualMof
v. Novack,
836 F.2dAND
397U(8th
Cir.
1987), FHUWGHQLHG488
8 J.See,
e.g.%URRNÀHOG&RPPF·QV,QFY:HVW&RDVW(QWP·W&RUS)G

7.
THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 23:2WK&LU
(2010).
9 See,
See Margreth
Barrett, )LQGLQJ7UDGHPDUN8VH7KH+LVWRULFDO)RXQGDWLRQIRU/LPLWLQJ,QIULQJHPHQW
8.
e.g.%URRNÀHOG&RPPF·QV,QFY:HVW&RDVW(QWP·W&RUS)G
WK&LU 
/LDELOLW\WR8VHV´,QWKH0DQQHURID0DUNµ43
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See Margreth Barrett, )LQGLQJ7UDGHPDUN8VH7KH+LVWRULFDO)RXQGDWLRQIRU/LPLWLQJ,QIULQJHPHQW/LDELOLW\
WR8VHV´,QWKH0DQQHURID0DUN,µ43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 893 (2008).
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liability on defendants who neither offer nor advertise products or services, and against
references to marks that are completely hidden from consumers, so that DQ\ meaningful
consumer reliance would be impossible.10
Other traditional limitations to the infringement cause of action have been gradually
undermined because courts have linked them to the ever-expanding likelihood of confusion
determination. For example, several Circuit Courts of Appeal held that the descriptive fair use
GHIHQVHFRGLÀHGLQWKH/DQKDP$FW E  11 was available only when the defendant’s
use caused no likelihood of confusion.12 While the Supreme Court ultimately rejected this
construction,13 lower courts have continued to consider the likelihood of confusion as an
important factor in evaluating whether the defendant’s use was descriptive and therefore
fair.14 Likewise, some courts have tied the concept of permissive nominative fair use to the
absence of consumer confusion.15 The issue of likely consumer confusion is also entangled
in determining the lawfulness of using marks in comparative advertising16 and expressive
works,17 and in applying the doctrine of exhaustion.18
The highly subjective nature of the likelihood of confusion determination itself, combined
ZLWKWKLVZHDNHQLQJRIWUDGLWLRQDOOLPLWDWLRQVDQGGHIHQVHVPDNHVLWGLIÀFXOWIRULQIULQJHPHQW
defendants to dismiss meritless claims early in litigation. The prospect of expensive and
protracted litigation of the confusion issue leads many (if not most) defendants to settle
overreaching infringement claims, rather than contest them. This further reinforces trademark
owners’ control. Mark owners vigilantly send out cease and desist letters to persons making
unauthorized reference to their marks. While most mark owners undoubtedly believe that
the claims they assert in these letters are viable under modern trademark precedent, the
10 See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009); PETA v. Doughney, 262 F.3d
359 (4th Cir. 2001); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F.Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998), aff’d, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir.
1998).
10. See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009); PETA v. Doughney, 262 F.3d 359
11
15 U.S.C.
1115(b)(4)
(4th Cir. 2001);
Jews§for
Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F.Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998), aff’d, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998).
12
See,
e.g.,
PACCAR,
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) Inc. v. Tile Scan Techs., LLC, 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003); KP Permanent
Make-UP,
Inc.PACCAR,
v. LastingInc.
Impression
I, Inc.,
328 F.3d
vacated,
543 U.S.
111 (2004);
12.
See, e.g.,
v. Tile Scan
Techs.,
LLC,1061
319 (9th
F.3d Cir.
243,2003),
256 (6th
Cir. 2003);
KP Permanent
MakeUP, Inc. v. Inc.
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I, Inc., 328 F.3d
(9th786,
Cir. 796
2003),
543 U.S. 111 (2004); Zatarains,
Zatarains,
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Inc., 1061
698 F.2d
(5thvacated,
Cir. 1983).
Inc.
Grove
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Inc., 698Inc.
F.2dv.
786,
796 (5th
Cir. 1983). I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004).
13 v. OakKP
Permanent
Make-Up,
Lasting
Impression
13. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004).
14 See, e.g.,
KP Permanent
Make-Up,
Inc. Inc.
v. Lasting
Impression
I, Inc.,
408 408
F.3dF.3d
596,596,
609 609
(9th (9th
Cir.Cir.
2005).
14.
KP Permanent
Make-Up,
v. Lasting
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I, Inc.,
2005).
15 See, e.g.,
See,Bd.
e.g.,ofBd.
of Supervisors
for State
L.A. Univ.
State Univ.
& Mech.
v. Smack
Apparel
Co.,
550465,
15.
Supervisors
for L.A.
Agric.Agric.
& Mech.
Coll. v.Coll.
Smack
Apparel
Co., 550
F.3d
F.3d 465,(5th
488-89
(5th Cir.
2008), FHUWGHQLHG
S.Ct.
2759Bros.
(2009);
Bros. Records,
Inc. v.318
Jardine,
488–89
Cir. 2008),
FHUWGHQLHG
129 S.Ct.129
2759
(2009);
Records,
Inc. v. Jardine,
F.3d 318
900, 908
F.3d(9th
900,Cir.
9082003),
n.5 (9th
Cir. 2003), FHUWGHQLHG540
U.S.Merck
824 (2003);
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HealthInc.,
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425
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402,
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Charles
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likelihood of post-sale confusion. Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 603 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir.
2010).
resale of plaintiff’s goods might cause a likelihood of post-sale confusion. Au-Tomotive

Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 603 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2010).
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letters and threat of expensive, protracted litigation undoubtedly chill many non-infringing,
pro-competitive, and First Amendment-protected uses of words and symbols, making the
DFWXDO UHDOZRUOG IRRWSULQW RI WUDGHPDUN SURWHFWLRQ HYHQ ODUJHU WKDQ WKDW GHÀQHG E\ FDVH
precedent. And as Eric Goldman pointed out in the course of Roundtable discussion, the
business community’s understanding of the limits of “safe” (non-letter inducing) use of
marks informs the private policies governing use and reference to trademarks that media and
Internet service providers such as Google, eBay, and Twitter adopt and impose on their users
as “private law.”
We are left with a “feedback loop,” which a number of Roundtable participants have
discussed at one time or another. The broader the rights trademark owners assert, the broader
consumers believe the rights to be. And the broader consumers believe the rights to be, the
more likely they will assume that third-party uses and references are licensed (as they are
´UHTXLUHGµWREH 7KLVOHDGVFRXUWVWRÀQGWKDWXQDXWKRUL]HGXVHVDQGUHIHUHQFHVWRPDUNV
mislead consumers (by causing them to think that the mark owner must have licensed them
when it has not). Courts accordingly impose liability, which leads mark owners to assert even
broader rights, which leads consumers to think even more uses must be licensed, which leads
FRXUWVWRÀQGHYHQPRUHDFWLRQDEOHFRQVXPHUFRQIXVLRQ
As Barton Beebe noted at the Roundtable, we are losing sight of the purpose of protecting
trademarks: we have come to see likelihood of confusion, in itself, as the harm to be
addressed. But likelihood of confusion is only HYLGHQFH of other possible harm, which should
EHIXOO\LGHQWLÀHGDQGZHLJKHGUHODWLYHWRFRPSHWLQJLQWHUHVWV+RZFDQZHHVFDSHWKLVF\FOH
which seems relentlessly to lead to increasingly stronger trademark rights, at the expense
of competition, First Amendment, and technological development interests? I advance the
following proposal as one possible approach.
II. A Proposed Cause of Action for “Passing Off/Associational Marketing”
I would look to the historical development of trademark law for inspiration, and suggest
that courts revive and stress the distinction, long understood in both the common law and the
Lanham Act, between ULJKWVLQtrademarks and ULJKWV DJDLQVW unfair competition, or passing
off. Laws recognizing rights in trademarks and rights against false advertising both branched
off from the passing off cause of action, and are essentially specialized forms or subclasses
of that older body of law.197KHFDXVHRIDFWLRQIRUSDVVLQJRII RXWVLGHRIWKHVSHFLÀFODZ
of trademark, trade name, and trade dress infringement) does not focus on the existence of
19
For more information about the historical development and relationship of these causes of action,
see Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28-30 (2003); Blinded Veterans Assn. v.
19.
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DIÀUPDWLYHULJKWVLQZRUGVRUV\PEROV,WIRFXVHVVWULFWO\RQWKHGHIHQGDQW·VFRQGXFWDQGWKH
potential marketplace harm it may cause.
Four classes of infringement cases clearly fall RXWVLGH the traditional boundaries of
trademark law and cause most of our current “sprawl-related” problems: 1) cases claiming
only confusion about sponsorship or a license agreement, where consumers are unlikely to
UHO\RQVSRQVRUVKLSRUDIÀOLDWLRQIRULQIRUPDWLRQDERXWSURGXFWTXDOLW\RUFKDUDFWHULVWLFV 
cases in which the defendant has not made a “trademark use” of the plaintiff’s mark; 3) cases
involving initial interest confusion or post-sale confusion; and 4) cases alleging infringement
through non-commercial speech. I suggest that courts evaluate these cases not as infringement
claims, but as a different category of passing off. This might serve to focus the evaluation on
factors RWKHUWKDQ the plaintiff’s ownership interest in an indication of origin, invite a more
careful evaluation of the actual nature and magnitude of harm the defendant’s acts pose to
the marketplace, and minimize the inherent urge to simply protect the plaintiff’s investment.
This would also afford an opportunity to impose limits on liability that may not be needed
in more traditional infringement contexts. To emphasize the distinction, one might simply
characterize these non-traditional trademark claims as “passing off” claims. However, since
trademark infringement is generally viewed as a part of the larger cause of action for passing
off, it might be more useful to devise a new name for these claims, to emphasize that they are
a separate and distinct subclass of the passing off group, apart from trademark infringement
and false advertising. I would propose the name “associational marketing” for the new class
of passing off claims.
A. A Template in the Restatements
The 5HVWDWHPHQWRI7RUWV and the 5HVWDWHPHQW 7KLUG RI8QIDLU&RPSHWLWLRQ, which are
generally understood to restate the common law as it existed at the time of their publication,
provide a rough template for my proposal. They each recognize a residual category of
“passing off” claims that fall RXWVLGHWKHERXQGDULHVof trademark, trade name, and trademark
infringement. They both impose greater limitations on these residual “passing off” causes of
action than they impose on infringement claims.
The 5HVWDWHPHQW RI 7RUWV, published in 1938, devoted Chapter 35, entitled “Confusion
of Source,” to the topic at hand. It divided the chapter into three distinct subtopics: 1)
“Fraudulent Marketing;” 2) “Infringement of Trade-Mark and Trade Name;” and 3) “Imitation
of Appearance of Goods.” The Introductory Note explained that while all three subtopics had
their foundation in the historical concept of “passing off,” the American Law Institute (ALI)
differentiated them because “[t]he protection given to the interest in trade-marks and trade
names, and, under certain conditions, to the interest in the physical appearance of goods
WUDQVFHQGVWKDWJLYHQXQGHUWKHQDUURZHUFRQFHSWLRQRI´SDVVLQJRIIµ 20 Trademark, trade
20

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra, note 20, Introductory Note to ch. 35, 535-42 (emphasis added).

20. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 19, Introductory Note to ch. 35, 535–42 (emphasis added).
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GUHVVDQGWUDGHQDPHSURWHFWLRQDUHSUHPLVHGRQDIÀUPDWLYHDOEHLWOLPLWHGRZQHUVKLSULJKWV
in words or symbols. At the time the 5HVWDWHPHQW RI 7RUWV was drafted, there was general
consensus that the plaintiff should no longer be required to demonstrate the defendant’s
fraudulent intent in trademark, trade name, and trade dress infringement cases.21 However,
the ALI recognized that the fraudulent intent requirement should remain in place for claims
of passing off that did not constitute infringement of protected indications of origin. The
Restatement denominated this residual category of passing off claims “fraudulent marketing.”
The RestatementGHÀQHG´IUDXGXOHQWPDUNHWLQJµDVPDNLQJD´IUDXGXOHQWVWDWHPHQWµWKDWWKH
speaker is another person, or is the other person’s agent or successor, or that the goods or services
the speaker is marketing were produced, processed, designed, or distributed by the other.22 The
accompanying comments elaborated that an actionable fraudulent misrepresentation could
take any form and be made in any manner “calculated to communicate its meaning.”23 No
use of a protected trademark, trade name, or trade dress was required. Liability for fraudulent
marketing required that the speaker act for the purpose of inducing persons to purchase his
goods or services, and that the circumstances be such that consumers would likely rely on
the misstatement to the commercial detriment of the plaintiff.24 This requirement of likely
consumer reliance was essentially a requirement that the misrepresentation be material to
consumer purchase decisions.25
In 1995, when the ALI undertook to draft the 5HVWDWHPHQW 7KLUG RI8QIDLU&RPSHWLWLRQ,
the law had further evolved to the point that fraudulent intent was no longer viewed as
an appropriate prerequisite even for this residual category of passing off cases that the
5HVWDWHPHQWRI7RUWVKDGLGHQWLÀHGDV´)UDXGXOHQW0DUNHWLQJµ26 The 5HVWDWHPHQWRI8QIDLU
&RPSHWLWLRQ retained the residual category, but dropped the “Fraudulent Marketing” title
and designated the category as a form of “deceptive marketing.” It stressed the distinction
between “deceptive marketing” and infringement of protected indications of origin,
HPSKDVL]LQJWKDWHYHQWKRXJKLQIULQJHPHQWFODLPVPLJKWOLWHUDOO\IDOOXQGHUWKHGHÀQLWLRQRI
´GHFHSWLYHPDUNHWLQJµWKH\VKRXOGEHEURXJKWSXUVXDQWWRWKHVHFWLRQVVSHFLÀFDOO\GHDOLQJ
with trademark, trade name, and trade dress infringement, and not under the rules set forth
for deceptive marketing.27
21
See Margreth Barrett, 5HFRQFLOLQJ)DLU8VHDQG7UDGHPDUN8VH28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1
(2010).
21.
Barrett,
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2010).
22 See Margreth
RESTATEMENT
OF T5HFRQFLOLQJ)DLU8VHDQG7UDGHPDUN8VH28
ORTS, supra, note 20, § 712.
22. RESTATEMENT
OF d.
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23
Id. at cmt.
23. Id. at Id.,
cmt.§ d.
24
712 (emphasis added).
24.
Id.
§
712
(emphasis added).
25
6HFWLRQGHÀQHGDFWLRQDEOHKDUPRU´FRPPHUFLDOGHWULPHQWµWRLQFOXGHGLUHFWGLYHUVLRQRI
6HFWLRQGHÀQHGDFWLRQDEOHKDUPRU´FRPPHUFLDOGHWULPHQWµWRLQFOXGHGLUHFWGLYHUVLRQRIVDOHVZKHQ
sales,
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RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 20, § 2 cmt. f, § 4 cmt. d..
26.
HIRDb.
) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 19, § 2 cmt. f, § 4 cmt. d.
27 RESTATEMENT
Id. at § 4(Tcmt.
27. Id. at § 4 cmt. b.
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The ALI categorized false advertising, passing off, and reverse passing off together, as
VSHFLÀFIRUPVRI´GHFHSWLYHPDUNHWLQJµLQWKHLURZQFKDSWHU28 In doing so, it characterized
the residual passing off cause of action as more nearly akin to the cause of action for
false advertising (which was now more generally accepted than it had been in 1938) than
to trademark, trade name or trade dress infringement. The 5HVWDWHPHQW 7KLUG  RI 8QIDLU
&RPSHWLWLRQ·V “Deceptive Marketing” chapter provides “general principles” applicable to all
the delineated forms of deceptive marketing in §§ 2 and 3, then addresses special subcategories
of deceptive marketing, including passing off, in § 4 and reverse passing off, in § 5.
6HFWLRQ  GHÀQHV ´GHFHSWLYH PDUNHWLQJµ DV PDNLQJ D UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ UHODWLQJ WR JRRGV
services, or commercial activities, in the course of marketing them, that is likely to deceive
or mislead prospective purchasers to the likely commercial detriment of another. The
comments stress that the cause of action for deceptive marketing only applies to commercial
speech,29 and that liability may only be imposed if the deception is “WRWKHOLNHO\FRPPHUFLDO
GHWULPHQWµ of the person seeking relief.”30 Section 3 provides that a misrepresentation will be
“to the likely commercial detriment of” the person seeking relief if it LVPDWHULDO (is likely to
“affect the conduct of prospective purchasers”), and there is a reasonable basis for believing
that the representation has caused or is likely to cause a diversion of trade from the plaintiff
or harm the plaintiff’s reputation or good will. Comment b adds that “[R]epresentations that
FRQFHUQPDWWHUVWKDWDUHWULYLDORURIOLWWOHRUQRVLJQLÀFDQFHWRSURVSHFWLYHSXUFKDVHUVDUH
not material.”31
28
Id. ch. 2. The 5HVWDWHPHQWRI7RUWV recognized a very limited cause of action for false advertising in §
761, which was grouped in a category of torts labeled “Miscellaneous Trade Practices.”
29
Id. § 2, cmt. a. According to the comment, “[d]etermining the likelihood that a representation will
28.
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The 5HVWDWHPHQW 7KLUG  RI 8QIDLU &RPSHWLWLRQ thus should be understood as providing
a cause of action for “residual” passing off claims that do not turn on infringement of valid
trademark, trade name, or trade dress rights and impose liability on a more conservative
EDVLV³UHTXLULQJDVSHFLÀFGHPRQVWUDWLRQRIFRPPHUFLDOGHWULPHQW DQGPDWHULDOLW\ DWOHDVW
when the defendant’s misrepresentation does not communicate that the plaintiff is the source
of the defendant’s goods or services (or the information inherent in the source—that the
defendant’s goods have the quality or characteristics of the plaintiff’s).
B. A Statutory Niche
&RXUWV KDYH VSHFLÀFDOO\ FRQVWUXHG /DQKDP $FW   D 32 to incorporate not only the
common-law cause of action for infringement of unregistered trademarks, trade names, and
trade dress, EXWDOVR the “residual” common-law cause of action for passing off, as described
in the 5HVWDWHPHQWRI7RUWV and 7KH5HVWDWHPHQW 7KLUG RI8QIDLU&RPSHWLWLRQ.33 In Dastar
&RUSY7ZHQWLHWK&HQWXU\)R[)LOP&RUSthe Supreme Court explained that § 43(a) goes
“beyond trademark infringement” to redress other forms of “false designation of origin,
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact which
. . . is likely to cause confusion . . . as to the origin . . . of . . . goods or services.”34 The
Court cautioned that “§ 43(a) does not have boundless application as a remedy for unfair
trade practices.” Rather, § 43(a) “prohibits actions like trademark infringement that deceive
consumers and impair a producer’s goodwill.” The Court noted that the Lanham Act should
be read “in accordance with the Act’s common-law foundations,” and (consistent with the
Restatement’s “commercial detriment”/materiality requirement) stressed that “the words of
the Lanham Act should not be stretched to cover matters that are typically of no consequence
to consumers.”35 The Dastar Court also made it clear that the residual passing off cause of
action should be applied carefully, in a manner that accommodates competing interests in free
competition, constitutional limitations, and public policy.
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Cases denominated “passing off” under modern common law and Lanham Act § 43(a) do
not focus on the plaintiff’s proprietary rights in a mark or other indication of origin, or on the
defendant’s use of protected words or symbols, as such. Rather, they focus on determining
ZKHWKHUWKHGHIHQGDQW·VDFWLRQVXQGHUWKHVSHFLÀFFLUFXPVWDQFHVRIWKHFDVHZLOOKDYHWKH
LPSDFWRI PLVUHSUHVHQWLQJWKH VRXUFHVSRQVRUVKLSRUDIÀOLDWLRQRILWVSURGXFWVRUVHUYLFHV
and thus confusing consumers. For example, a number of “passing off” cases have addressed
situations in which the defendant uses the same generic word as the plaintiff to identify its
product or service. They have held that use of the same JHQHULF ZRUG, in itself, will not
constitute passing off, but a showing of additional acts or omissions on the defendant’s part
PD\)RUH[DPSOHLIWKHGHIHQGDQWLVDODWHUHQWUDQWWRWKHÀHOGFRXUWVPD\ÀQGWKDWLWKDVDQ
DIÀUPDWLYHREOLJDWLRQWRHQDEOHFRQVXPHUVWRGLVWLQJXLVKLWVJRRGVIURPWKHSODLQWLII·V³E\
clearly labeling its products, adding additional, distinguishing words or symbols, adopting
dissimilar packaging or marketing materials, or by providing disclaimers. Or courts may
HQMRLQWKHODWHUXVLQJGHIHQGDQWIURPWDNLQJDIÀUPDWLYHDFWLRQVWKDWDJJUDYDWHWKHOLNHOLKRRG
of confusion created through use of the same generic words or symbols, such as referring
to its products as “genuine,” or “the original,” or duplicating the plaintiff’s catalog or style
numbers.36
In other cases courts have found actionable passing off when the defendant misrepresented
itself as the plaintiff’s agent, thereby causing a likelihood of confusion about the plaintiff’s
´DIÀOLDWLRQ ZLWK WKH GHIHQGDQW RU LWV VSRQVRUVKLS RU DSSURYDO RI WKH GHIHQGDQW·V EXVLQHVV
activities.”37 In another example, a court found that the plaintiff (who advertised its product
heavily on television) stated a § 43(a) passing off claim against a defendant (who did little
television advertising), when the defendant promoted its competing product “as advertised
on TV.”38&RXUWVKDYHUHOLHGRQ/DQKDP$FW D WRÀQGDFWLRQDEOHSDVVLQJRIIZKHQD
defendant reproduced non-trademark aspects of the plaintiff’s personal identity in marketing
its products or services—a form of false representation of endorsement.39 In addition, they
have found that substitution cases (where the customer orders plaintiff’s brand, but the
defendant silently supplies defendant’s product instead) can constitute “passing off” under
§ 43(a).40
36
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Thus, just as in the Restatements, Lanham Act § 43(a) providesERWK a cause of action for
infringement of unregistered indications of origin and a cause of action for a residual category
of “passing off” claims (that do not involve use of protected indications of origin). As in
common law, “residual” passing off no longer requires that the defendant act with fraudulent
intent. Many of the decisions do not expressly discuss the issue of materiality. In most cases,
it is unnecessary to do so, because the alleged misrepresentation suggests that the plaintiff
is the source of the defendant’s product or service, and materiality can be assumed. The
Supreme Court’s decision in the Dastar case nonetheless suggests that materiality remains
a highly relevant element in evaluating claims that deviate from that traditional scenario.
And there is precedent, in addition to the Restatements, for imposing an express materiality
requirement. For example, in .LQJY$PHV41 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected
a § 43(a) passing off claim on the ground that the alleged misrepresentation would not be
material to purchasers. In .LQJ, the daughter of a deceased blues singer sued the defendant,
who had falsely named himself as “producer” on the back of CDs of the blues singer’s live
recordings. In rejecting the reverse passing off claim the Fifth Circuit expressly required
WKDW WKH GHIHQGDQW·V PLVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQEHPDWHULDO³WHQGWRLQÁXHQFHFRQVXPHUV·SXUFKDVH
decisions—as a precondition to passing off liability.
C. My Proposed Cause of Action for Passing Off/Associational Marketing
As noted supra, I would relegate four classes of claims now brought and evaluated as
“trademark infringement” to evaluation as a form of residual passing off claim, pursuant
WR/DQKDP$FW D )RUHIÀFLHQF\,ZRXOGFDOOWKHVHFODLPV´SDVVLQJRIIDVVRFLDWLRQDO
marketing” claims. They include:
1. Infringement claims involving FRQIXVLRQ RYHU WKH H[LVWHQFH RI D OLFHQVLQJ RU RWKHU
UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH SDUWLHV ZKHQ FRQVXPHUV DUH XQOLNHO\ WR ORRN WR WKH VXSSRVHG
UHODWLRQVKLSIRUFRQFUHWHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWSURGXFWTXDOLW\RUFKDUDFWHULVWLFV. This category
of cases would look much like the category of cases that Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna
describe in their “Irrelevant Confusion” article,42 and for which they advocate application of
a materiality prerequisite to recovery.
41
King v. Ames, 179 F.3d 370, 373-75 (5th Cir. 1999). See also Silverman v. CBS, 870 F.2d 40, 49 (2d
Cir. 1989).
41.
v. Ames,&179
F.3d 370,
373–75
Cir. 1999).
See also Silverman
CBS, 870the
F.2d
40, 49 (2d Cir.
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RUDIÀOLDWLRQµWHUPLQRORJ\LQWUDGHPDUNLQIULQJHPHQWFDVHVDQGUHIUDPHWKHLQIULQJHPHQWLVVXHDVZKHWKHU
42.
Lemley &use
McKenna,
supra
note
3. Lemley
and
McKenna
proposeabout
to eliminate
the “sponsorship
the defendant’s
of a similar
mark
is likely
to cause
consumer
confusion
who is responsible
for the or
DIÀOLDWLRQµ
WHUPLQRORJ\
WUDGHPDUN
FDVHV
DQG
UHIUDPH
WKH LQIULQJHPHQW
DV into
ZKHWKHU
quality
of the
defendant’sLQ
goods.
Id. at LQIULQJHPHQW
415, 427. They
would
relegate
trademark
claims notLVVXH
falling
this WKH
defendant’s
use
of
a
similar
mark
is
likely
to
cause
consumer
confusion
about
who
is
responsible
for
the
quality
category to be dealt with, if at all, through a cause of action “analogous to false advertising.” Id. at 427. This
of
the
defendant’s
goods.
Id.
at
415,
427.
They
would
relegate
trademark
claims
not
falling
into
this
category
suggestion is consistent with mine, except I would avail myself of the existing “passing off” cause of action, to
be dealt awith,
at all, of
through
a causeclaims
of action
“analogous
false
advertising.”
at 427.
This suggestion
include
widerif range
infringement
in the
category,toand
introduce
a widerId.range
of limitations
and is
consistentbeyond
with mine,
except I would avail myself of the existing “passing off” cause of action, include a wider
defenses,
materiality.
range of infringement claims in the category, and introduce a wider range of limitations and defenses, beyond
materiality.

IP THEORY

Volume 1: Issue 1

13

2. Infringement claims in which the GHIHQGDQWKDVQRWXVHGDQDOOHJHGO\LQIULQJLQJZRUG
RUV\PERO´DVDWUDGHPDUNµWRLGHQWLI\WKHVRXUFHRIJRRGVRUVHUYLFHVWKDWLWLVPDUNHWLQJ
This would include Internet infringement cases in which the defendant has made a hidden
reference to the plaintiff’s mark (for example, in web site metatags or as a key word to trigger
advertising), to which consumers are not exposed. It would also include cases in which the
defendant does not closely associate the allegedly infringing word or symbol with goods or
services that it is marketing, so that consumers are unlikely to understand the use as indicating
the source of the defendant’s goods or services—for example Internet cases in which the
defendant incorporates the plaintiff’s mark into its domain name, or features the mark on its
web site, but does not sell or advertise goods or services on the web site.
3. Infringement claims in which the SODLQWLIIUHOLHVRQDWKHRU\RILQLWLDOLQWHUHVWFRQIXVLRQ
RUSRVWVDOHFRQIXVLRQ
4. Claims alleging LQIULQJHPHQW WKURXJK XVH RI WKH SODLQWLII·V PDUN LQ QRQFRPPHUFLDO
VSHHFKFor this purpose I would stress that the term “commercial speech” does not encompass
all speech made in a commercial context, or that has some connection with other speech
that is commercial.43 Rather, this category of claims would include any case in which the
defendant’s referral to the plaintiff’s mark does more than merely propose a commercial
WUDQVDFWLRQDVGHÀQHGLQWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW·V)LUVW$PHQGPHQWMXULVSUXGHQFH44
These four classes of infringement claims all exceed the traditional scope of rights that
trademark owners have in words or symbols, and have all been criticized as going well beyond
ZKDWLVQHFHVVDU\WRIXOÀOOWKHSXUSRVHVRIWUDGHPDUNSURWHFWLRQ7KHVHFDVHVJHQHUDOO\GRQRW
threaten the kinds of marketplace harm that trademark law was created to prevent. Rather,
they have generally arisen through misplaced notions of property rights arising from the
fact of investment. While the actions targeted in these cases may enable free riding in some
instances, or undermine the mark owner’s ability to control the unique “identity” and image
it has constructed for its brand, they generally do not pose meaningful harm to consumers, or
consumers’ reliance interests in marks, or threaten direct diversion of trade through mistaken
purchases.
$W WKH VDPH WLPH HQIRUFLQJ ULJKWV LQ WKHVH IRXU FODVVHV RI FDVHV PD\ SRVH D VLJQLÀFDQW
impairment of societal interests in marketplace competition, development of new market
43
See, PETA
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v. Doughney,
263359
F.3d(4th
359Cir.
(4th2001);
Cir. 2001);
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525
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related digital technologies, and First Amendment interests.45 Because they threaten to upset
the proper balance of competing interests, they need a good, hard looking-over, beyond what
is normally required for more “traditional” trademark infringement cases, before relief is
granted.
Because these four classes of claims assert rights that exceed those generally necessary
to protect societal interests in avoiding confusion, and may impair other, competing societal
interests, they should be considered RXWVLGH WKH IUDPHZRUN RI RZQHUVKLS ULJKWV LQ ZRUGV
RU V\PEROV, like residual passing off claims that don’t allude to marks or that only entail
use of similar generic words or symbols. Evaluating them as passing off claims, rather than
LQIULQJHPHQWFODLPVZRXOGKRSHIXOO\GRZQSOD\WKHLQÁXHQFHRIRZQHUVKLSDQGLQYHVWPHQW
and focus the courts instead on the SUDFWLFDOLPSDFW of the defendant’s actions. Outside of
the infringement context, courts should focus more critically on the nature and magnitude of
likely harm arising from the defendant’s actions, in light of the surrounding circumstances.
In this less routine evaluation, courts might be encouraged to put the defendant’s actions
into a larger context, and evaluate them in light of overall competition interests, their impact
on the parties’ and the public’s First Amendment interests, and on developing technologies.
These classes of claims are also better evaluated as “passing off” claims because there is more
SUHFHGHQWDQGÁH[LELOLW\WRUHFRJQL]HDQGDSSO\DGGLWLRQDOÀOWHULQJSUHVXPSWLRQVGHIHQVHV
DQGRWKHUOLPLWDWLRQV, beyond those imposed in trademark infringement cases. I will discuss
WKHVHÀOWHULQJSUHVXPSWLRQVGHIHQVHVDQGRWKHUOLPLWDWLRQVIXUWKHULQWKHQH[WVXEVHFWLRQ
Michael Grynberg has expressed concerns that courts may refuse to take the initiative to
make reforms of this nature, due to trends toward judicial formalism and textualism. 46 This
would be most unfortunate. Because the Lanham Act was intended to codify the common
law, courts have played a particularly important role in shaping the causes of action the Act
provides.47 Congress has tended to follow the courts’ lead. Many of Congress’ amendments
WRWKH/DQKDP$FWKDYHVLPSO\FRGLÀHGLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVDQGGHIHQVHVDOUHDG\FUHDWHGE\WKH
courts.48 Thus, it seems appropriate and well-precedented for courts to undertake reform of
the kind I suggest. Indeed, when Congress amended Lanham Act § 43(a) in 1988 to codify
the interpretation that courts had given to that provision, the Senate Report accompanying
the amendment expressly stated an expectation that “the courts [will] continue to interpret
the section.”49
45
I have discussed these impairments elsewhere, so I will not reiterate them here. See
45.
I have Barrett,
discussed,QWHUQHW7UDGHPDUN6XLWVDQGWKH'HPLVHRI´7UDGHPDUN8VHµ39
these impairments elsewhere, so I will not reiterate them here. See MargrethU.C.
Barrett,
Margreth
,QWHUQHW7UDGHPDUN6XLWVDQGWKH'HPLVHRI´7UDGHPDUN8VHµ39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371 (2006).
D
AVIS L. REV. 371 (2006).
46. Michael Grynberg, 7KLQJV $UH :RUVH 7KDQ :H 7KLQN 7UDGHPDUN 'HIHQVHV LQ D ´)RUPDOLVWµ $JH 24

46
Grynberg,
BERKELEYMichael
TECH. L.J.
897, 9277KLQJV$UH:RUVH7KDQ:H7KLQN7UDGHPDUN'HIHQVHVLQD´)RUPDOLVWµ$JH24
(2009). But see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, 'HYHORSLQJ'HIHQVHVLQ7UDGHPDUN/DZ
B
ERKELEY
T
ECH
.
L.J.
897,
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. 99 (2009).
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When protection of marks poses special threats to competition or free speech interests,
courts have not hesitated to respond with special rules and defenses. For example, in:DO
0DUW6WRUHV,QFY6DPDUD%URV50 the Supreme Court responded to competition concerns by
ruling categorically that product feature trade dress cannot be deemed inherently distinctive,
but must be demonstrated to have acquired secondary meaning as a prerequisite to protection.
For the same reasons, several of the Circuits have fashioned special standards for determining
likelihood of confusion in product feature infringement cases.51 In light of First Amendment
concerns, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declined to extend the doctrine of initial
interest confusion in Internet cases.52 Several Circuit Courts of Appeals have adopted special
balancing tests to be applied in infringement claims involving the titles of expressive works.53
Both the Ninth and the Third Circuits have adopted express rules or defenses to enable
nominative uses of marks.54 Courts should continue to recognize and accept this responsibility
to maintain the proper balance of interests in Lanham Act cases. With regard to my proposal,
many of the necessary mechanisms are already in place.
0RVWPDUNRZQHUVZKRÀOHVXLWDOOHJLQJ/DQKDP$FW  D LQIULQJHPHQWRIUHJLVWHUHG
marks also allege violation of § 43(a) as a back-up, recognizing that § 43(a) covers a wider
array of passing off claims. Nothing in the Lanham Act’s statutory language itself would
SURKLELWFRXUWVIURPHYDOXDWLQJWKHIRXULGHQWLÀHGFODVVHVRILQIULQJHPHQWFODLPVDVFDXVHVRI
action for passing off under Lanham Act § 43(a), even if the claims allege infringement of a
registered mark.
As originally enacted, Lanham Act § 32(1)(a)55 provided for infringement liability when a
defendant’s use of a registered mark was “likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive
purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods or services”.56 In 1962, Congress amended
this language to delete the words “purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods or
services,”57WKXVVHHPLQJWRGHOHWHWKHVSHFLÀFUHTXLUHPHQWWKDW´SXUFKDVHUVµEHFRQIXVHG
about the “source” of goods or services. This amendment might be construed to DXWKRUL]H
FRXUWVWRLPSRVHOLDELOLW\LQFDVHVRIDOOHJHGFRQIXVLRQRYHU´VSRQVRUVKLSµRU´DIÀOLDWLRQµ
50
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
51
See, e.g., Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1997), FHUWGHQLHG
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or in cases of post-sale or initial interest confusion, but it LPSRVHVQRDIÀUPDWLYHREOLJDWLRQ
on courts to do so.58
In 1988, Congress amended Lanham Act § 43(a) expressly to impose liability on persons
who use (in connection with goods or services) a false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact which “is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive DVWRWKHDIÀOLDWLRQFRQQHFWLRQRUDVVRFLDWLRQ
RIVXFKSHUVRQZLWKDQRWKHUSHUVRQRUDVWRWKHRULJLQVSRQVRUVKLSRUDSSURYDORIKLVRU
KHUJRRGVVHUYLFHVRUFRPPHUFLDODFWLYLWLHVE\DQRWKHUSHUVRQ.”59 Congress undertook this
general rewriting of the § 43(a) language “to codify the interpretation it ha[d] been given
by the courts.”60 7KH ODQJXDJH PDNHV LW FOHDU WKDW FODLPV RI FRQIXVLRQ DERXW ´DIÀOLDWLRQµ
or “association” (a license or endorsement), for example, are appropriately litigated under
§ 43(a).
3ULRU WR WKH  DPHQGPHQWV /DQKDP$FW   GHÀQHG D ´WUDGHPDUNµ DV ´DQ\ ZRUG
name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer
or merchant to identify and distinguish his goods, including a unique product, from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is
unknown.”61:KLOHWKHELOODPHQGHGWKHGHÀQLWLRQRIDWUDGHPDUNWRDFFRPPRGDWHWKH
new “intent to use” registration procedures,62 it did not undertake to track the changes it made
WRWKHODQJXDJHRI D ³WKDWLVLWGLGQRWUHGHÀQHDWUDGHPDUN as indicating source or
DIÀOLDWLRQFRQQHFWLRQDVVRFLDWLRQVSRQVRUVKLSRUDSSURYDO7KLVPLJKWVXSSRUWDQDUJXPHQW
that Congress intended that claims about licenses, endorsements, and other party relationships
58
The legislative history provides little information about Congress’ intent in deleting that statutory
language. It only suggests that the deletion was made to make the language of § 32(1)(a) “parallel to a similar
change made in § 2(d),” S. Rep. No. 2107, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2844, 2851,
58. The legislative history provides little information about Congress’ intent in deleting that statutory language.
ZKLFKFRGLÀHVWKHFRPPRQODZ·V´ÀUVWLQWLPHÀUVWLQULJKWµUXOHRISULRULW\IRUSXUSRVHVRIPDUNUHJLVWUDWLRQ
It only suggests that the deletion was made to make the language of § 32(1)(a) “parallel to a similar change
Prior to the 1962 amendments, § 2(d) prohibited registration of a mark that was likely “to cause confusion or
PDGHLQ G µ65HS1RWK&RQJG6HVV  86&&$1ZKLFKFRGLÀHV
mistake or to deceive purchasers.” The amendments deleted the word “purchasers,” and the accompanying
WKHFRPPRQODZ·V´ÀUVWLQWLPHÀUVWLQULJKWµUXOHRISULRULW\IRUSXUSRVHVRIPDUNUHJLVWUDWLRQ3ULRUWRWKH
Senate Report explained that Congress deleted the word to avoid misconstruction, “since the provision
1962 amendments, § 2(d) prohibited registration of a mark that was likely “to cause confusion or mistake or
actually relates to potential purchasers as well as to actual purchasers.” Id., 1962 U..S.C.C.A.N. at 2847.
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that do not communicate source, product quality or characteristics be litigated as passing off
claims under § 43(a), rather than as registered or unregistered trademark infringement.
&RXUWVFRXOGFHUWDLQO\ÀQGVWDWXWRU\ODQJXDJHOHJLVODWLYHKLVWRU\DQGFDVHODZWRMXVWLI\
relegating infringement cases to a “passing off” evaluation when the defendant made
no “trademark use.”63 Moreover, while there is no statutory language expressly limiting
infringement claims to commercial speech or point-of-sale confusion, there is likewise no
express language requiring such claims to be litigated as “infringement” rather than passing
off. Courts expanded the infringement cause of action to encompass such claims and they
should be able to re-classify them as passing off claims.
D. Limitations and Defenses on “Passing Off/Associational Marketing” Claims
+DYLQJ FKDQQHOHG WKH FDVHV LGHQWLÀHG LQ WKH SULRU VHFWLRQ LQWR D   D  ´SDVVLQJ RII
associational marketing” evaluation, we can focus on the evaluation process itself. These
categories of cases—1) cases alleging confusion over the existence of sponsorship or
DIÀOLDWLRQ DOLFHQVLQJDJUHHPHQW ZKHUHFRQVXPHUVDUHXQOLNHO\WRORRNWRWKHOLFHQVHIRU
information about product quality; 2) cases in which the defendant did not make a “trademark
use”; 3) cases relying on initial interest or post-sale confusion; and 4) cases asserting claims
against statements made in non-commercial speech—assert harms to mark owners that are
PRUHLQGLUHFWDQGLQGHÀQLWHDQGOHVVFHQWUDOWRWKHFRUHSXUSRVHVRIWUDGHPDUNODZDQGSRVH
questionable harm to consumers. For this reason, they are less likely to justify the potential
impairment they pose to competing interests in marketplace competition, First Amendment
interests, and the interest in unfettered development of new digital marketing tools. They
should be more carefully scrutinized and subjected to additional limitations and defenses
beyond those imposed against trademark uses in commercial speech that threaten point-of-sale
source/quality confusion. The following subsections discuss particular kinds of limitations or
defenses that should be considered. They draw liberally from ideas expressed by some of the
other Roundtable participants. Some of them overlap with others.
Michael Grynberg has raised the point that Lanham Act § 33(b)64 may be construed to limit
infringement defenses to those it expressly lists.65 He has also cited precedent suggesting
that traditional defenses to trademark infringement, such as abandonment, may not be found
to extend to residual passing off claims.66 I would make lemonade of these concerns. To the
extent that § 33(b) limits courts’ ability to augment defenses to LQIULQJHPHQW OLDELOLW\, its
prohibition should not extend to a claim for residual passing off, where the liability does
not turn on the plaintiff’s ownership of valid trademark rights. Section 33(b) concerns itself
63
64
65
63.
66
64.
65.
66.
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strictly with rights in trademarks. It limits challenges to “the validity of the registered
mark,” “the registration of the mark,” “the registrant’s ownership of the mark,” and “the
registrant’s exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce.” Since the residual
passing off cause of action provides rights beyond those afforded through trademark
ownership or registration, the ownership, registration, or validity of the plaintiff’s mark
is essentially irrelevant. Moreover, even if courts are disinclined to extend trademark
LQIULQJHPHQWVSHFLÀFGHIHQVHV VXFKDVDEDQGRQPHQW WRUHVLGXDOSDVVLQJRIIFODLPVWKDW
does not prevent them from developing a specially tailored set of defenses to passing off/
associational marketing claims.
1. Materiality Requirement
Rebecca Tushnet, Mark Lemley, Mark McKenna, Michael Grynberg, and others have
advocated imposing a materiality requirement in at least some infringement causes of action,
and this is a sound suggestion. As the 5HVWDWHPHQW 7KLUG RI8QIDLU&RPSHWLWLRQ suggests,
materiality might be assumed in infringement actions when a competitor or producer of related
goods uses a mark in a manner that is likely to confuse consumers about product source (and
by implication, about the product’s quality and characteristics). Indeed, the early common
law imposed an inherent materiality requirement by limiting the infringement cause of action
to cases involving similar or related products and confusion about source.67 However, courts’
subsequent expansion of actionable confusion has left that built-in assurance of materiality
along the wayside. When the likely consumer confusion is not about source or responsibility
for product quality, only occurs at times other than the point of purchase, or is not made
in direct, perceptible reference to a product or service that the defendant is marketing (as
in the non-trademark use cases), materiality is not self-evident, and the defendant should
be required to prove it. As Bob Bone stressed in the course of the Roundtable, without a
showing of materiality (that is, that the alleged misrepresentation about source, sponsorship,
RUDIÀOLDWLRQZRXOGEHDVXEVWDQWLDOIDFWRULQFRQVXPHUV·SXUFKDVHGHFLVLRQ WKHUHLVQRKDUP
from a societal standpoint. Yet a likelihood of harm clearly is a prerequisite to a Lanham Act
cause of action.68
67
As noted earlier, there is some case precedent for imposing a materiality requirement in passing off
cases. See supra note 48. Rebecca Tushnet has pointed out that limiting the likelihood of confusion evaluation
to “relevant” consumers (those who might be interested in buying the parties’ products) is also a “VXEURVD
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Imposing a materiality requirement in passing off/associational marketing cases may prove
problematic, however. Materiality is generally a matter of consumer perception, much like the
likelihood of confusion inquiry. Undertaking to assess the materiality of misrepresentations
to consumers could augment the length, cost, and complexity of litigation, and thus further
increase the chilling effect that threats of litigation have on competition and First Amendment
interests. Moreover, we may encounter the same kind of feed-back loop with materiality that
we experience in the likelihood of confusion context. Just as mark owners have convinced
consumers that all third-party uses of marks must be licensed (leading consumers to assume
that any third-party use they encounter therefore LV licensed), mark owners may convince
consumers that the existence of a license agreement provides material information about
quality (after all, rules regarding mark abandonment essentially require that mark owners
oversee the quality of their licensee’s goods,69 even if that requirement is rarely enforced).
Mark owners may also argue for an expansive understanding of “materiality”—for example,
that the misrepresentation that a licensing relationship exists is material to consumers
because it imparts the licensor’s prestige and “personality” to the licensed goods—a valuable
psychological boost to the image-conscious consumer.
2QHUHVSRQVHWRWKHVHSRWHQWLDOSUREOHPVPLJKWEHWRGHÀQHPDWHULDOLW\LQDSUHVFULSWLYH
rather than a descriptive way—that is, make some legal conclusions about what should and
should not be deemed material by consumers: quality factors may be material, but prestige
IDFWRUV PD\ QRW 2U D VSHFLÀFVHHPLQJ product HQGRUVHPHQW E\ a particular person or
organization may be material, while a more general suggestion of DVVRFLDWLRQZLWK the same
person or organization may not. In initial-interest confusion cases, materiality might be judged
not by the substance of the misrepresentation (since the consumer knows the truth by the time
any purchase is made), but by the effort the consumer must undergo to leave the defendant’s
VLWHDQGÀQGWKHSODLQWLII·V,IDOOWKHFRQVXPHUQHHGVWRGRLVFOLFNWKH´EDFNµEXWWRQRQKLV
computer and return to his search result, then it might be assumed that he will expend that
HIIRUWLIWKHPLVUHSUHVHQWHGVRXUFHRUDIÀOLDWLRQLVPDWHULDOWRKLP
2. Proximate Cause
To some extent, the issue of proximate cause is related to the materiality issue, and could be
assumed in more traditional infringement contexts. (The defendant’s use of the mark causes
consumers to be confused and make mistaken purchase decisions, which harms both the
consumers and the mark owner). However, some of the recent Internet cases that dispense with
any meaningful “trademark use” requirement suggest that more conscious consideration of
proximate cause might be in order. For example, when a defendant makes a KLGGHQDSSOLFDWLRQ
of a mark—deep in proprietary software, so that consumers are never exposed to or aware of
it—it is hard to see how that hidden use itself causes either confusion or any of the harm that
69
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confusion might bring. In such cases it is the VFUHHQGLVSOD\ generated as the result of the
hidden application that should be deemed the proximate cause of any subsequent consumer
confusion and harm. To put it another way, the application of the mark is merely a means of
getting a message to consumers. It is the message itself that has the capacity to confuse them.
In the Internet context, this distinction may be particularly important, as different entities
may control the means and the message.70 Imposing a proximate cause limitation may enable
,QWHUQHWVHUYLFHSURYLGHUVWRXVHPDUNVWRHIÀFLHQWO\DJJUHJDWHDQGLQGH[PDUNHWLQIRUPDWLRQ
for consumers, free from the chilling effect of mark owner threats of suit.71
Of course, if courts succeed in turning their focus away from the defendant’s application
of the plaintiff’s mark (with all its attendant property and free riding implications) in the
passing off context, and concentrate instead on the larger overall message that is conveyed
WRFRQVXPHUVWKDWVKRXOGDOVRKHOSWRÀ[OLDELOLW\RQWKHSUR[LPDWHFDXVHRIDQ\LQMXULRXV
confusion.
3. The Likelihood of Confusion Determination
Courts should also consider adjusting their likelihood of confusion evaluation in these
“associational marketing” cases, given their more tangential relationship to the core concerns
of trademark law. Again, the Roundtable participants discussed some useful approaches.
One approach would be to raise the necessary showing of likely confusion beyond what has
been required in more mainstream “trademark use in commercial speech causing a likelihood
of point-of-sale confusion about source/quality” cases. Instead of accepting survey evidence
demonstrating that 10-15% of consumers may be confused, impose a higher threshold, such
as a PDMRULW\RIFRQVXPHUV7KLVZRXOGEHMXVWLÀHGJLYHQWKDWWKHSRWHQWLDOKDUPFDXVHGE\
the confusion is more questionable, and the potential damage caused by overprotection is
greater by comparison.
Another approach might embrace a more prescriptive (as opposed to descriptive) standard
for measuring likelihood of consumer confusion. Courts could create presumptions that
certain pro-competitive or expressive actions are unlikely to cause confusion.72 Over time,
70
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such presumptions may assist to shape consumer perceptions, so that they are less likely to rely
on those presumptively non-confusing actions for material information. Bill McGeveran has
advocated creating statutory “safe harbors” that would simply exempt certain uses of marks
from liability, regardless of likelihood of confusion.73 Other Roundtable members expressed
FRQFHUQWKDWFDUYLQJRXWVSHFLÀFH[FHSWLRQVRUGHIHQVHVWRLQIULQJHPHQWPD\OHDGWRIXUWKHU
GRFWULQDOFUHHSHQFRXUDJLQJFRXUWVWRÀQGDFWLRQDEOHDOOXVHVWKDWDUHnot within the stated
scope of the exception or defense. Counterbalancing these concerns, express carve-outs would
reduce the cost and length of litigation and might discourage chilling threats of litigation in
cases in which the defendant’s actions arguably fall within the carve-out. I would advocate a
judicially created irrebuttable presumption that actions consisting of non-commercial speech
cause no actionable likelihood of confusion. As McGeveran notes, the harm that relief would
pose to free speech interests would almost always outweigh the harm the allegedly infringing
speech poses to trademark interests. And to the extent that there are exceptions to this general
UXOHWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLYHFRVWVRIÀQGLQJWKHPZLOORXWZHLJKWKHYDOXHRIGRLQJVR'XULQJ
Roundtable discussions, Rebecca Tushnet emphasized how defamation and false advertising
law tolerate false speech. Adopting a per se rule that occasionally permits such false speech in
the associational marketing cases seems equally acceptable in the interest of promoting First
Amendment values.74
Perhaps more central to my own proposal in this article, courts should not focus on the
similarity of the parties’ marks when evaluating likelihood of consumer confusion in passing
off/associational marketing cases. The emphasis should not be on the defendant’s use of “the
plaintiff’s” word or symbol, because the claim seeks relief beyond the scope of rights afforded
by trademark ownership—it asserts rights in the absence of the defendant’s trademark use,
or for kinds of confusion that are not central to the core concerns of trademark law, or do not
directly lead to mistaken purchases. Rather, courts should consider the total context in which
consumers receive the defendant’s alleged misrepresentation. In particular, if the defendant’s
product has other source indicators associated with it, courts should consider the ameliorating
effect that their presence might have. Courts should also consider any other confusionHQKDQFLQJRUPLWLJDWLQJLQÁXHQFHVVXFKDVSURGXFWSDFNDJLQJRUDGHVFULSWLYHRUQRPLQDWLYH
context. If it appears that the defendant was attempting merely to describe its own goods,
compare them to the plaintiff’s, or explain how they might be used with the plaintiff’s, for
example, that should give rise to a presumption that the defendant succeeded in communicating
that non-actionable message to consumers (much as courts have routinely presumed that
if the defendant undertook to confuse consumers it succeeded in doing so). Particularly in
cases lacking traditional “trademark use” by the defendant, courts should consider how likely
73
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consumers are to associate the defendant’s actions with products or services the defendant
LVPDUNHWLQJRUWRUHO\RQWKHPIRULQIRUPDWLRQDERXWSURGXFWVRXUFHRUDIÀOLDWLRQ$QGLI
consumers encounter the defendant’s reference to the mark in non-commercial speech, courts
should critically evaluate the likelihood that they will understand that reference to identify the
VRXUFHRUDIÀOLDWLRQRIWKHGHIHQGDQW·VSURGXFWVRUVHUYLFHV
It would also be very helpful to draw courts’ attention to literature describing the results
of cognitive behavior and literary theory research regarding how consumers actually react to
marks in various settings. Some of the Roundtable participants have already made good use
of this new source of information.75 These studies may counteract some of the more extreme
concerns of trademark owners.
4. Limited Remedies
Finally, courts should cultivate more limited remedies in associational marketing cases, and
avoid outright injunctions against all use of confusing words and symbols. As several of the
Roundtable participants remarked, threats of litigation made through cease and desist letters
may pose greater harm to competition and free speech interests than do the results in litigated
cases. If mark owners are less certain of fully enjoining unauthorized uses of their marks, they
may be less inclined to litigate, and thus less likely to challenge such uses through cease and
desist letters.
,QPDQ\FDVHVDGLVFODLPHUVKRXOGEHVXIÀFLHQWWRSURWHFWFRQVXPHUUHOLDQFHLQWHUHVWV$V
Laura Heyman has noted,76 it is unclear why courts have been hesitant to rely on disclaimers
to address Lanham Act harms, given how much reliance the law places on disclaimers
and warnings in other contexts, such as product liability cases. Particularly when potential
confusion harm is indirect or relatively minor, requiring a disclaimer, in lieu of prohibiting
WKHGHIHQGDQW·VXVHPD\SURYLGHDEHQHÀFLDOFRPSURPLVHRIFRPSHWLQJLQWHUHVWV7KHUHLV
certainly precedent for this approach.77
III. Conclusion
I propose treating claims for the newer, more extreme extensions of trademark
SURWHFWLRQDVFODLPVIRUSDVVLQJRIILQDQDWWHPSWWRFRXQWHUDFWWKHLQÁXHQFHRILQKHUHQWEXW
LQDSSURSULDWH ´SURSHUW\µ LQVWLQFWV WKDW VHHP WR DULVH ZKHQ PDUN RZQHUV DVVHUW DIÀUPDWLYH
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rights in marks and emphasize their investment in converting “marks” into “brands.”
Focusing on ULJKWVDJDLQVW passing off, in lieu of ULJKWVLQ trademarks may encourage courts
to give greater weight to consumer interests and concerns, and to more actively consider and
weigh the purported harm posed by many unauthorized uses of marks. A passing off context
provides greater leeway to consider the collective impact of all the circumstances surrounding
the defendant’s alleged misrepresentation, to introduce limiting doctrines of materiality and
proximate cause, and to consider more demanding standards of likely consumer confusion,
WKDWEHWWHUUHÁHFWWKHPDJQLWXGHRISRWHQWLDOKDUPLQVXFKFDVHVDQGWKHSRWHQWLDOIRUGDPDJH
to competing marketplace interests.
While courts may be more focused on a textual analysis of Lanham Act claims today
than they have been in the past, my proposal may provide courts some comfort through its
FRQVLVWHQF\ZLWKWKH$FW·VVWDWXWRU\ODQJXDJHDQGLWVÀWZLWKLQDORQJDFFHSWHGFRPPRQODZ
“residual” category of passing off claims. It reminds us that the Lanham Act has never been
solely focused on ownership of marks, and that when passing off is at issue, rather than
a traditional trademark infringement claim, there is historical precedent for more careful
scrutiny.
The proposed “passing off/associational marketing” cause of action is no panacea: it would
be far better if the infringement cause of action had not expanded to such a point that it requires
drastic counteraction. Judicial-driven reforms are messy and inconsistent, and there is no
JXDUDQWHHWKDWQHJDWLYHUHDFWLRQVWR´IUHHULGLQJµZRQ·WÀQGWKHLUZD\LQWRFRXUWV·SDVVLQJRII
analysis, as they have in infringement claims.78 But the danger of that seems less severe than
LQ WKH ´WUDGHPDUN ULJKWµ FRQWH[W DQG WKH SDVVLQJ RII FDXVH RI DFWLRQ VKRXOG SURYH ÁH[LEOH
enough to bring in countervailing concerns to moderate the anti-free-riding instincts. Courts
PLJKW HQFRXQWHU WKH PRVW GLIÀFXOW LVVXH IURP D OLWLJDWLRQ VWDQGSRLQW LQ PDNLQJ WKH LQLWLDO
cut—deciding which claims fall into the delineated categories of “associational marketing”
claims, and thus should be channeled into a passing off analysis. My own preference would be
to over-include, rather than under-include. Meritorious claims are likely to prevail, even if they
are subject to the more rigorous scrutiny of the proposed passing off cause of action.
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